The Role of Representations in Executive Function: Investigating a Developmental Link between Flexibility and Abstraction.

Young children often perseverate, engaging in previously correct, but no longer appropriate behaviors. One account posits that such perseveration results from the use of stimulus-specific representations of a situation, which are distinct from abstract, generalizable representations that support flexible behavior. Previous findings supported this account, demonstrating that only children who flexibly switch between rules could generalize their behavior to novel stimuli. However, this link between flexibility and generalization might reflect general cognitive abilities, or depend upon similarities across the measures or their temporal order. The current work examined these issues by testing the specificity and generality of this link. In two experiments with 3-year-old children, flexibility was measured in terms of switching between rules in a card-sorting task, while abstraction was measured in terms of selecting which stimulus did not belong in an odd-one-out task. The link between flexibility and abstraction was general across (1) abstraction dimensions similar to or different from those in the card-sorting task and (2) abstraction tasks that preceded or followed the switching task. Good performance on abstraction and flexibility measures did not extend to all cognitive tasks, including an IQ measure, and dissociated from children's ability to gaze at the correct stimulus in the odd-one-out task, suggesting that the link between flexibility and abstraction is specific to such measures, rather than reflecting general abilities that affect all tasks. We interpret these results in terms of the role that developing prefrontal cortical regions play in processes such as working memory, which can support both flexibility and abstraction

The practice of going helps children to stop:The importance of context monitoring in inhibitory control

How do we stop ourselves during ongoing action? Recent work implies that stopping per se is easy given sufficient monitoring of contextual cues signaling the need to change action. We test key implications of this idea for improving inhibitory control. Seven- to 9-year old children practiced stopping an ongoing action, or monitoring for cues that signaled the need to go again. Both groups subsequently showed better response inhibition in a Stop-Signal task than active controls, and practice monitoring yielded a dose-response relationship. When monitoring practice was optimized to occur while children engaged in responding, the greatest benefits were observed – even greater than from practicing stopping itself. These findings demonstrate the importance of monitoring processes in developing response inhibition, and suggest promising new directions for interventions

Less-structured time in children's daily lives predicts self-directed executive functioning.

Executive functions (EFs) in childhood predict important life outcomes. Thus, there is great interest in attempts to improve EFs early in life. Many interventions are led by trained adults, including structured training activities in the lab, and less-structured activities implemented in schools. Such programs have yielded gains in children's externally-driven executive functioning, where they are instructed on what goal-directed actions to carry out and when. However, it is less clear how children's experiences relate to their development of self-directed executive functioning, where they must determine on their own what goal-directed actions to carry out and when. We hypothesized that time spent in less-structured activities would give children opportunities to practice self-directed executive functioning, and lead to benefits. To investigate this possibility, we collected information from parents about their 6-7 year-old children's daily, annual, and typical schedules. We categorized children's activities as "structured" or "less-structured" based on categorization schemes from prior studies on child leisure time use. We assessed children's self-directed executive functioning using a well-established verbal fluency task, in which children generate members of a category and can decide on their own when to switch from one subcategory to another. The more time that children spent in less-structured activities, the better their self-directed executive functioning. The opposite was true of structured activities, which predicted poorer self-directed executive functioning. These relationships were robust (holding across increasingly strict classifications of structured and less-structured time) and specific (time use did not predict externally-driven executive functioning). We discuss implications, caveats, and ways in which potential interpretations can be distinguished in future work, to advance an understanding of this fundamental aspect of growing up

Flexible rule use: Common neural substrates in children and adults

AbstractFlexible rule-guided behavior develops gradually, and requires the ability to remember the rules, switch between them as needed, and implement them in the face of competing information. Our goals for this study were twofold: first, to assess whether these components of rule-guided behavior are separable at the neural level, and second, to identify age-related differences in one or more component that could support the emergence of increasingly accurate and flexible rule use over development. We collected event-related fMRI data while 36 children aged 8–13 and adults aged 20–27 performed a task that manipulated rule representation, rule switching, and stimulus incongruency. Several regions – left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), left posterior parietal cortex, and pre-supplementary motor area – were engaged by both the rule representation and the rule-switching manipulations. These regions were engaged similarly across age groups, though contrasting timecourses of activation in left DLPFC suggest that children updated task rules more slowly than did adults. These findings support the idea that common networks can contribute to a variety of executive functions, and that some developmental changes take the form of changes in temporal dynamics rather than qualitative changes in the network of brain regions engaged

Visual Representation in the Wild: How Rhesus Monkeys Parse Objects

Visual object representation was studied in free-ranging rhesus monkeys. To facilitate comparison with humans, and to provide a new tool for neurophysiologists, we used a looking time procedure originally developed for studies of human infants. Monkeys' looking times were measured to displays with one or two distinct objects, separated or together, stationary or moving. Results indicate that rhesus monkeys used featural information to parse the displays into distinct objects, and they found events in which distinct objects moved together more novel or unnatural than events in which distinct objects moved separately. These findings show both common-alities and contrasts with those obtained from human infants. We discuss their implications for the development and neural mechanisms of higher-level vision.Psycholog

Metacognitive processes in executive control development:The case of reactive and proactive control

Young children engage cognitive control reactively in response to events, rather than proactively preparing for events. Such limitations in executive control have been explained in terms of fundamental constraints on children’s cognitive capacities. Alternatively, young children might be capable of proactive control but differ from older children in their meta-cognitive decisions regarding when to engage proactive control. We examined these possibilities in three conditions of a task-switching paradigm, varying in whether task cues were available before or after target onset. Reaction times, ERPs, and pupil dilation showed that 5-year-olds did engage in advance preparation, a critical aspect of proactive control, but only when reactive control was made more difficult, whereas 10-year-olds engaged proactive control whenever possible. These findings highlight meta-cognitive processes in children’s cognitive control, an understudied aspect of executive control development

Individual differences in emotion-cognition interactions: Emotional valence interacts with serotonin transporter genotype to influence brain systems involved in emotional reactivity and cognitive control

The serotonin transporter gene (5-HTTLPR) influences emotional reactivity and attentional bias toward or away from emotional stimuli, and has been implicated in psychopathological states, such as depression and anxiety disorder. The short allele is associated with increased reactivity and attention toward negatively-valenced emotional information, whereas the long allele is associated with increased reactivity and attention towardpositively-valenced emotional information. The neural basis for individual differences in the ability to exert cognitive control over these bottom-up biases in emotional reactivity and attention is unknown, an issue investigated in the present study. Healthy adult participants were divided into two groups, either homozygous carriers of the 5-HTTLPR long allele or homozygous carriers of the short allele, and underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while completing an Emotional Stroop-like task that varied in the congruency of task-relevant and task-irrelevant information and the emotional valence of the task-irrelevant information. Behaviorally, participants demonstrated the classic “Stroop effect” (responses were slower for incongruent than congruent trials), which did not differ by 5-HTTLPR genotype. However, fMRI results revealed that genotype influenced the degree to which neural systems were engaged depending on the valence of the conflicting task-irrelevant information. While the “Long” group recruited prefrontal control regions and superior temporal sulcus during conflict when the task-irrelevant information was positively-valenced, the “Short” group recruited these regions during conflict when the task-irrelevant information was negatively-valenced. Thus, participants successfully engaged cognitive control to overcome conflict in an emotional context using similar neural circuitry, but the engagement of this circuitry depended on emotional valence and 5-HTTLPR status. These results suggest that the interplay between emotion and cognition is modulated, in part, by a genetic polymorphism that influences serotonin neurotransmission